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ABSTRACT 
 
After 2004, where the Danish buildings code changed from prescriptive to performance based 
requirements for fire safety, the number of installed fire protections systems has increased 
with about 30 percent. Furthermore, fire safety strategies often call for combinations of active 
fire protection systems, such as a smoke detection system, sprinkler system, warning system 
and fire ventilation system. However, only smoke detections systems and sprinkler systems 
require inspection from an independent accredited company, whereas the other systems’ 
functionality is entirely up to the professionals that install them and the owner’s maintenance 
schedule, both of which do not require any supervision from the authorities. Herein, 12 
complex buildings, in which all fire protections systems were inspected by an independent 
accredited company, were studied to see whether or not the buildings adhere to the fire safety 
design in their operational phase. The results showed that the functionality of the 
interconnected fire protection systems was not as designed in the performance-based analysis. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of this functionality the fire safety level is not at high as the 
authorities’ demand, something which could have fatal consequences in the event of a fire. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Active fire protection systems are all considered as one specific entity (such as sprinkler 
system, alarm system, and ventilation system), and designed after their own standards and 
guidelines. In Denmark, only two of the systems require inspection and approval from the 
authorities before the building is approved for use. The problem identified and discussed 
herein is that all of the fire protections systems in the building are not considered as one 
interconnected system, and therefore the interconnected fire protections systems are not 
inspected for combined functionality. On the contrary, the individual fire protection systems 
are tested without any reference to how they should interact with other systems in the case of 
a fire. 
 
On the other hand, the interconnected fire protection systems are considered as one entity in 
the performance-based design that is undertaken by the fire safety engineer and presented in 
the fire strategy report that has to be approved by the authorities having jurisdiction before 
the building can be commissioned. As such, the appropriate fire safety level can only be 
reached if all the systems work, both by themselves and in interplay with the other systems. 
This includes going to error mode when such interconnected systems are not receiving the 
appropriate input signals from the systems they are meant to interact with in an emergency 
situation. Without such an error mode reported to the controlling system, the operator in the 
control center at the fire brigade will not receive this error and will thus be unable to fix the 
cause of the error mode.  
 
In Denmark, the building authority approves the performance-based analysis of the fire safety 
design. The process include a verification process to ensure that the standards that the fire 
engineer use for the fire safety design are the appropriate ones to reach the expected fire 
safety level in the building. The legislation is intended to demand a certain safety level [1], 
but these demands are not explicitly quantified in the Building Regulations (BR10) [2]. The 
detailed requirements are provided in the accompanying performance-based guidance 
document [3]. The legislation has one demand for the functionality of the fire safety system, 
which is that the systems should function in the entire lifetime of the building. However, 
there are no demands for any specific documentation for how the occupants or building 
owner should ensure this. 
 
In the operational phase, the fire brigade is allowed to make fire inspections in buildings 
covered by the Order on Operational Requirements, which is published by the Ministry of 
Defense and provides all the maintenance and inspection requirements for passive and active 
fire protection solutions [4]. Buildings that are constructed after performance-based analysis, 
which normally have several active fire protection systems installed, do not automatically 
require a fire inspection. Rather, an inspection will only take place if some part of or the 
entire building’s occupancy type is covered by the operational regulations.  
 
Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of how the responsibility of the fire safety of a 
building changes from the design and construction phase to the operational phase.  
 
    
 
Figure 1 Overview of the Danish Fire Safety Legislation System. Legislation for buildings is shown in 
green, whereas legislations for the fire brigade are shown in blue. 
Smoke Detection System Statistics 
 
Statistics from Aalborg for the period from 1996 to 2012 show that there was a steady 
increase in the number of automatic fire alarm (ABA) systems in the municipality, as seen in 
Figure 2 [5]. These systems are installed after a guideline and inspected by an accredited 
inspection company every year [6]. 
 
In 2012, the Aalborg Fire Brigade control center received 308 alarms from automatic fire 
alarm (ABA) systems. The causes that lead to activation of the alarm system were registered 
in the Aalborg Fire Brigade internal system, and are shown graphically in Fig. 3 [5]. Only in 
two of the ten fire cases had fire spread beyond the ignition object, and only those two fires 
needed action from firefighters to extinguish the fire. It can also be seen that it was mainly 
operational and behavioral actions that caused the activation of the smoke detections system. 
Legislator 
Building 
Regulations [2] 
Guidelines  Standards 
Building Permit 
Operational 
Phase 
Operational 
Regulations [4] 
Fire Inspection 
227 of the recorded alarms were due to misbehavior, whereas the remaining 71 alarms were 
categorized as unknown. These were further subdivided into 59 alarms without known cause 
and 12 alarms caused by pressure drop in the sprinkler system without sprinkler activation. It 
should be noted that there is no tradition for further examination of the failures. 
 
Figure 2 The number of automatic fire alarm systems in Aalborg municipality versus calendar year [5]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Causes for the automatic fire alarms received by the Aalborg Fire Brigade in 2012. 
 
The Danish Institute for Fire and Safety Technology (DBI) publishes the guidelines that are 
used for the majority of fire protection systems in Denmark. DBI is also one of the two 
accredited inspection companies for fire protection systems, and they publish an annual 
report that shows statistics from all their inspections [7]. The result for 2011 (published in 
2012) report a reliability of 99.1% for smoke detection systems, which is rather remarkable 
given that the Aalborg Fire Brigade statistics [5] shows there only have been fires in 3.2% of 
the cases where the smoke detections system had been activated. As such, there is a 
discrepancy between reliability and performance that calls for further investigation. 
 
The Aalborg statistics from 2012 [5] compares well with those from Vineland, New Jersey 
were statistics shows there only was a real fire in only 3 % of the causes were the Fire 
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Brigade was called out by activated smoke detection [8]. In the same study, it was 
documented that 70% of the 244 calls from smoke detections system in three high rise 
buildings were false alarms. The false alarms could be placed in 4 categories: i) Improper 
operation, ii) Building workers started without notifications, iii) System malfunctions and iv) 
Damage on the system. They succeeded in bringing the false alarms down with 50% by 
focusing on training/education, improved procedures and communication, and by 
investigating causes for false alarms [8]. As a final comparison, a Swedish study of the alarm 
failure problem concluded that there is only a fire in 6.4% of the cases where fire protections 
systems are activated [9]. 
 
METHOD 
 
The current study investigated the functionality of interconnected fire protections systems in 
12 large buildings located across Denmark. In all off the cases, an inspection was required in 
the building permit, for all of the fire protections systems. The data in the cases are from 
accredited inspections firm, who agreed to provide these inspection reports from performance 
based building for the project. The inspected buildings were as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Overview of the different buildings studied herein. 
Case #  Use Area [m2] 
total/detached 
Occupancy 
Category 
BR10 [2] 
Inspection company 
and the respective 
journal nr. 
Installed fire 
protection 
system* 
1  Shopping center 18,500/3,000 1, 2 & 3 RMG-10357-3-2012 ABA, AVS, ABV-
27, AVA-24. 
2  Shopping center 21,500/3,500 1, 2 & 3 DBI-IF00026/IG00015 AVS, ABV-27, 
AVA-024. 
3  Shopping center 25,000/- 1, 2 & 3 RMG-29.10-012/PBN AVS, ABV-27, 
AVA-24. 
4  School 4,500/- 2 & 3 BCA note/DBI-B10406 AVS, ABV-27, 
AVA-24. 
5  Sports complex 34,000/7,500 3 Inspection date 
filibustered 
AVS, ABV-27, 
AVA-24. 
6  Shopping center 36,000 2 & 3 RMG-16100-15-2010 AVS, ABV-27, 
AVA-24. 
7  School 2,000 2 & 3 RMG-16744 ABV-27. 
8  Water 
amusement park 
9,000 3 RMG-15690 ABA, AVS, ABV-
27, AVA-24. 
9  Pressurized 
stairways High- 
rise building 
-  RMG-17987 ABA; DS/EN 
12101-6. 
10  Pressurized 
stairways in 
Car park in 
basement/hotel. 
-  RMG-18181 ABA, DS/EN 
12101-6. 
11  Nightclub - 3 RMG-12837-15-2012 ABV-27. 
12  Supermarket 7,250 3 RMG-18044-2012 ABA, AVS, ABV-
27, AVA-024. 
*ABA = Automatic Smoke Detection System; AVS = Automatic Sprinkler System; ABV = Automatic Fire 
Ventilation System, 27 [10] or 027 [11] describes the standard the system is referring to; AVA = Automatic 
Warning System, 24 [12] or 024 [13] describes the standard the system is referring to. 
  
Case #4 – School Building 
 
For a building that is designed using performance-based design, the failures are registered 
when the fire systems were inspected after the buildings were reported as finished. The case, 
a high school with a floor area of approximately 4,500 m2, was taken into use in the autumn 
of 2012. Table 2 shows the connection between the fire systems, whereas Figure 4 details the 
failures registered in this building case. It is seen that the interdependency of the systems is 
not as desired due to an abundance of errors.   
 
Table 2 The interconnectivity of the systems in Case #4 – School Building.  
 Activation of  Mechanical smoke ventilation Warning systems (Voice) Alarm transmission to Fire Brigade  Atrium sprinkler Fire doors shut automatically upon detection Elevator goes to ground floor (ABA) smoke detector NO YES YES - YES YES Line/flame detector NO YES YES YES NO YES (AVS) sprinkler NO - NO PARTIAL NO - (ABV) Smoke ventilation NO - NO - NO - Fire call press - YES YES - NO YES Atrium sprinkler YES YES YES - NO - 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Example of the data collection and failure registration in Building Case #4. The white text 
represents activity with unwanted functionality, whereas the yellow text represents activity with wanted 
functionality. 
 
Automatic Fire 
Alarm System 
(ABA) 
Automatic Sprinkler 
System (AVS)  
• Atrium sprinklers were not 
activated due to malfunction of 
line detector. 
Mechanical Smoke 
Ventilation System 
(ABV) 
• System documentation 
according to DBI-27 [10] 
• Error transfer from ABV-
central. 
• Failure signal from supply-air 
(door). 
• Failure signal from supply-air 
(window). 
Automatic Warning 
System (AVA) 
• System documentation 
according to DBI 24 [12] 
• Documentation sound pressure 
report and understandable 
speech. 
• Failure signal from power 
failure of (AVA)-rack. 
Escape Lights 
• Due to water damage in central, 
malfunction all over. 
• Documentation of the 
measurements of the light 
intensity output of the panic 
lights 
Other 
• The self-closing fire doors in 
the basement malfunctioned.  
• Smoke ventilation in 
staircase does not open on 
signal from smoke detector. 
• Elevator goes  to the ground 
floor.  
Categorization of Failures 
 
The categorization of the observed failures was performed according to the required protocol 
as provided in the guidelines by The Danish Institute for Fire and Safety Technology [14]. 
This method is used by accredited inspection companies during their inspections. During the 
first inspection, up to two C-failures are allowed. Systems with a single occurrence of an A- 
or B-failure cannot be approved. The defects are categorized as follows: 
A: Significant deficiencies that can result in a non-functional system.  
B: Deficiencies that can result in a situation where parts of the system will be non-functional.  
C: Minor deficiencies, which could ultimately result in a situation where the system or parts 
thereof will not provide the expected protection. 
D: Correct functionality 
 
Using this method, it was possible to categorize the systems as ‘Approved’, ‘Conditionally 
Approved’ and ‘Not Approved’. Conditionally approved means that the found failure should 
be fixed and the fire system re-inspected within 3 months. 
  
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Observed Failures in the Inspection Cases  
 
Figure 5 provides an overview of the categorization of the observed failures of the automatic 
smoke ventilation system for the 12 inspection cases in the current study.  
 
Figure 5 Failure categorization (A-, B- or C-failure or D – Satisfactory Performance) of the automatic 
smoke ventilation system for all cases in this study. Note that some of the buildings did not have such a 
system. 
In 64% of the inspected buildings, there was an A-failure, and in all of the inspected 
buildings B-failures were recorded (Case #5 is excluded from this). Actually, in 72% of the 
inspection cases more than one B-failure was registered. Only a few C-failures were recorded 
during the inspections, something which may come as a result of the large number of A- and 
B-failures. It is perceived that, as a result of the abundance of these graver errors, the 
inspector did not bother to concentrate on the minor details, as it was clear that further work 
on the systems were needed for approval. It is concerning that the capacity of the smoke 
ventilation systems were found to be insufficient (as compared to the design capacity from 
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the fire safety strategies) in 40% of the investigated cases. In one case, only 33 % of the 
needed capacity, as calculated by the fire safety engineer, and this would quite clearly have a 
significant effect on the fire safety level.  
In 83% of the investigated systems, there was no transmission signal from errors arising from 
the doors or windows that serve as openings for supply air for the smoke ventilation to 
function according to design. If the right amount of supply air is not brought into the 
building, the smoke venting capacity may not be sufficient, or worse yet, the smoke flow 
direction may be reversed. 
In 89% of the investigated cases there was no signal from errors that occurred in the smoke 
ventilation system central. The consequence of this would be that the maintenance personnel 
need to detect the error manually during inspections according to the maintenance protocol. 
As a result, the system is significantly less likely to function as prescribed during an 
emergency event.   
Figure 6 provides an overview of the categorization of the observed failures of the automatic 
smoke ventilation system for the 12 inspection cases. The total absence of C-failures is 
noteworthy, as it is completely against common reliability theory.  
 
Figure 6 Failure categorization of the automatic warning systems in this study. Note that some of the 
buildings did not have such a system. 
Table 3 presents the total count and score for each of the failure categories for both the smoke 
ventilation system and the warning system for all the inspections. 
Table 3 Total score for A-, B- and C-failures for both smoke ventilation and warning system for all cases. 
 Type of Failure 
 A B C D 
(Satisfactory 
Performance) 
Total failure count for  
the smoke ventilations system  
20 39 4 6 
Total failure count for  
the warning systems 
11 16 0 3 
 
Figure 7 is a radar-diagram showing A-, B-, and C-failures along with D – Satisfactory 
Performance. Clearly, A- and B-failures are the ones with strongest representation, whereas 
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there is a low population of C-failures, which is probably due to the large count of A- and B-
failures, as discussed above. The figure also shows that there are significantly more failures 
for the smoke ventilations systems (ABV) than for the warning systems (AVA). This is in 
line with results presented by Klote and Milke, who reported that ventilation systems often 
can have a low reliability due to the fact that consist of a large number of components [15]. 
 
Figure 7 Radar-diagram showing A-, B-, and C-failures, as well as Satisfactory Performance (D), for 
smoke ventilation and warning systems. 
Overall Results of the Investigated Cases 
Figure 8 shows that the functionality of the interconnected fire protections systems is not 
satisfactory. That is, the functionality is not as designed in the performance-based analysis, 
which means that the fire safety does not match the one demanded by the authorities having 
jurisdiction. Such a reduction in the safety can obviously lead to fatal consequences in the 
case of a fire. Given that the smoke detection system and sprinkler system is under accredited 
inspections, the problems are transferred to the smoke ventilation system and warning 
system, and apparently there are challenges associated with installing these systems 
according to the guidelines/standards.  
 
Figure 8 Overall results for all the interconnected fire protection system, categorized according to the 
required protocol for an accredited inspection firm.  
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The results presented in percent are showing a trend, but due to the small investigated 
population, this could not be considered as well documented as individual occurrences can 
dominate the total outcome. 
 
Results for the Smoke Ventilation Systems 
 
In 100% of the investigated cases there was not the system documentation as demanded in 
the guideline [10, 11]. Only 60 % of the investigated cases had the needed flow capacity, and 
the fire resistance of the fan was only documented as sufficient in 40% of the cases.  No error 
was transferred to the controlling system in 83% of the cases for failures associated with the 
supply air (doors/windows). In 89% of the cases, an error with origin in the ABV-central was 
not transferred to the controlling system (ABA).  
 
Figure 7 Results for the system failures that were found for the smoke ventilation systems. The OK is only 
labeled once, but applies to the other columns with the same color. 
 
Results for the Warning Systems 
 
None of the investigated cases had system documentation and drawings that verified that the 
interconnected system has a built-in redundancy. This is to ensure that if one system were to 
fail, the other will still be able to function. Even though the requirement is that all systems are 
composed of certificated components, this was not always the case, as cases of use of non-
standard parts were detected.  
 
The error transfer to the controlling system failed in 85 % of the investigated cases. Another 
significant problem occurred in all of the cases, which was that the noise associated with the 
operation of the mechanical smoke ventilation system was so loud that it was impossible to 
hear the sounding from the warning system in that zone.  
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Figure 8 Results for system failures found for warning systems. 
 
Figure 9 shows the overall outcome of the study (left) and the inspection statistics from The 
Danish Institute for Fire and Safety Technology. Although the system types are not the same, 
the discrepancy of the results calls for a different and more thorough inspection in order to 
create appropriate statistics, as there is a difference between ‘working’ and ‘working 
according to the fire safety strategy’. That is, simply starting the system for a short period 
does not account for a proper inspection, as all components and system interdependencies 
have to be check for appropriate performance and dimensioning. The full details of all the 
observations in each of the cases are presented in a report by Kærup [17].   
 
 
Figure 9 The overall results for each fire protection system in the building. 
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ABV, Smoke Ventilation   
NOT APPROVED 
  
A-failure: 70% of the cases 
  B-failure: 100% of the cases 
AVS, Sprinkler System 
RELIABILITY: 95.4% [16] 
AVA, Warning System   
NOT APPROVED 
A-failure: 100% of the cases 
B-failure: 100% of the cases 
 
ABA, Smoke Detection  
RELIABILITY: 99.1% [7] 
Is the fire safety level in 
the building sufficient? 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results from the series of in-depth system inspections in buildings with interconnected 
fire safety systems presented herein are quite disconcerting. The inspections revealed that, 
even though all the systems that are mentioned in the fire strategy report are installed and are 
operable, their interdependency and their functionality are often not according to the 
prescribed design. This means that a lot of effort and money is put into the fire safety design 
in vain. Furthermore, as there are no inspection procedures or guidelines that require an 
inspection of the overall functionality of the interconnected fire protections systems, it 
appears to have a low priority, as it is then perceived to only have a cost associated with the 
inspection and no visible gain. The lack of inspections in the construction phase, upon 
commissioning and in the operational phase leads to a lack of information about the fire 
protection systems, something which in turn makes it close to impossible for the maintenance 
personnel to secure the correct interconnectivity of these systems.  
 
Obviously, there is a challenge ahead when published reports show that the reliability of the 
certain automatic alarm systems is as high as 99.1%, whereas the statistics from the Aalborg 
Fire Brigade show that only approximately 3% of alarms were due to fire. The statistics show 
that approximately 80% of the reasons for the detection of the smoke detection system are 
due to attitude behavior, where instructions, training and education is one way of reducing the 
reasons for false alarms. In Denmark, fines have also been introduced for false alarms, both 
as an incentive to work towards fewer false alarms, but also to recover some of the costs 
associated with this unnecessary use of the fire brigades. It is emphasized that this is not a 
critique of the reports published by DBI, but rather a call for a change in the inspection 
requirements, so that the reliability of the interconnected systems can be as high as for the 
individual systems.     
 
The results also show that we need to consider all the interconnected fire protection systems 
as one (1) system that has a huge influence on the fire safety level in the building. Still, each 
different fire protection system should be inspected according to the relevant 
standard/guideline. In addition, there should also be undertaken an overall inspection that 
focus on the functionality of the systems, as described by the fire safety engineer in the fire 
strategy report. 
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